Hpkris
Front section flyer
Når man ser denne videon så burde den helt klart vært avbrutt ja. Håpe de finner ut årsaken etterhvert.
Russland ligger utrolig høyt oppe på ulykkes toppen nå.
Flyulykke i Russland
- Thread starter bgo-flyer
- Start date
Når man ser denne videon så burde den helt klart vært avbrutt ja. Håpe de finner ut årsaken etterhvert.
Russland ligger utrolig høyt oppe på ulykkes toppen nå.
Har vært litt Texas på Russisk flyvninger: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qe50R7Iufls&feature=related
Men ellers er deres "Middle marker" lyd suveren! Gammel telefon.
Men ellers er deres "Middle marker" lyd suveren! Gammel telefon.
Sweeper, jeg regner med at du snakker flytende russisk siden du uttaler deg så sterkt. Min russisk er nok dårligere enn din, men så er jeg bare utdannet tolk i språket og det er noen år siden sist jeg var i landet.
Kapteinen er veldig kaptein - akkurat sånn som en del Widerøe, SAS og Braathens kapteiner var før CRM. Bortsett fra at han er en bedrevitende kødd, skjønner jeg ikke helt hvor du vil hen.
Kapteinen er veldig kaptein - akkurat sånn som en del Widerøe, SAS og Braathens kapteiner var før CRM. Bortsett fra at han er en bedrevitende kødd, skjønner jeg ikke helt hvor du vil hen.
SE-SAM
ScanFlyer Silver
En mycket tragisk olycka!! Hade Stefan Liv som min gäst innan han åkte till Ryssland!
En fantastisk ishockey målvakt och en underbar människa.
Hade fru och två små pojkar Herman o Harry 2 o 5 år gamle!
Hoppas man finner orsaken till olyckan!!
Allt gott,
/Hans (SE-SAM)
En fantastisk ishockey målvakt och en underbar människa.
Hade fru och två små pojkar Herman o Harry 2 o 5 år gamle!
Hoppas man finner orsaken till olyckan!!
Allt gott,
/Hans (SE-SAM)
Attachments
Mr G kan hjelpe deg å finne mye rart. Then "engage brain" før du poster med en slik påstand.
I dag skriver Aftenposten at besetningen kan ha glemt å ta av håndbremsen (???) før avgang.
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/sport/ishockey/article4226683.ece
Har fly håndbrekk ??
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/sport/ishockey/article4226683.ece
Har fly håndbrekk ??
Her er den rusiske avis
som skriver om park brake
Established cause of the accident Yak-42: pilots forgot to turn off the parking brake
http://translate.google.se/translat...-zabyili-otklyuchit-stoyanochnyiy-tormoz.html
Established cause of the accident Yak-42: pilots forgot to turn off the parking brake
http://www.mk.ru/incident/article/2...-zabyili-otklyuchit-stoyanochnyiy-tormoz.html
Ulf
som skriver om park brake
Established cause of the accident Yak-42: pilots forgot to turn off the parking brake
http://translate.google.se/translat...-zabyili-otklyuchit-stoyanochnyiy-tormoz.html
Established cause of the accident Yak-42: pilots forgot to turn off the parking brake
http://www.mk.ru/incident/article/2...-zabyili-otklyuchit-stoyanochnyiy-tormoz.html
Ulf
Og da har samferdselsdepartementet dementert utsagnene om at park brake var årsaken.
http://lenta.ru/news/2011/09/14/nobrakes/
http://lenta.ru/news/2011/09/14/nobrakes/
Og da har vi en ny
report fra det russiske MAK , opdaterat 17/9
http://www.mak.ru/
http://translate.google.se/translat...&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http://www.mak.ru/&act=url
09/17/2011
According to the results of the field phase of the investigation the crash of the Yak-42 RA 42 434 in the terminal area of Yaroslavl and in accordance with a preliminary analysis of available documentation and data decryption means of objective control of the Technical Commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) was established:
Takeoff weight and center of gravity aircraft did not exceed the permissible limits.
Before beginning the takeoff flaps were set at 20 degrees (take-off position), the stabilizer -8.7 degrees on the pitch up, which corresponds to the estimated 24-25% of the alignment of the MAR.
Before takeoff the crew double-check all the channels had control of the aircraft, including the channel of the elevator, the elevator was deflected cleanly. The maximum recorded deflection of the elevator pitch up to 21 degrees, which corresponds to a constructive stop. Last check was performed for 1 minute and 40 seconds before takeoff.
Weather conditions at the time of the accident: wind 360 - 3 m / s, visibility 10 km, clouds significant stratocumulus lower limit of 990 m, the temperature of +17.8, 747.9 mm Hg pressure. Art., friction coefficient of 0.6.
Take off from runway 23 was carried out. Taxiing aircraft to take off was carried out by RD 5. Distance from RD 5 to the input end of runway 23 of about 300 meters. The total runway length of 3000 meters.
The crew decided to take off at nominal operation of the engine. Preliminary simulations showed that the rate of up to ~ 165 km / h acceleration rate corresponded to the plane actually installed engine thrust.
The rise of the nose wheel crew began at approximately 185 km / h. The elevator was rejected by pitch up to values of 9-10 degrees (about half speed), but the growth of the pitch angle has not happened. After 6 seconds the engine was installed takeoff mode. In the future, despite the output of engines for takeoff, the growth speed slowed significantly, which may be explained by the appearance of additional braking force. The actual value of an additional braking force will be established based on the results of mathematical modeling and field experiment, scheduled on a plane analog-to LII. MM Gromov. On the part of OKB preparing flight program of the meeting.
Surviving the braking systems of the aircraft sent to study in a specialized institution. Studies brake system started on 16 September.
The maximum speed is reached the plane, is approximately 230 km / h. In spite of continuing rejection of the elevator pitch up to the separation plane on the runway did not happen. According to the sketch scene of the accident, the actual separation of aircraft took place at a distance of 400 meters at the exit end runway 23 after deflection of the elevator at 13-14 degrees and the relocation of the stabilizer up to 9.5 degrees on the pitch up. After separation of the aircraft from the ground was his encounter with the antenna system localizer and the rapid growth of the pitch angle to 20 degrees for 2-3 seconds. Maximum height, which scored aircraft - of 5-6 meters.
Later followed by intensive krenenie plane to the left and its collision with obstacles and the ground.
According to the results the calculations of fragments of the aircraft revealed that at the time of the accident flaps and slats were installed during take-off position, the spoilers are retracted, the stabilizer in position about 10 degrees pitch up. Wiring layout elevator control showed that at the time of the accident was not disconnecting the wiring.
The Technical Commission fulfills all possible versions of the occurrence of additional braking force on the takeoff and the reasons why the aircraft failed to make timely detachment from the runway.
In connection with appearing in the media numerous "versions" of the causes of the accident with the Yak-42D RA-42 434, referring to close to the investigation of the "experts", the Technical Commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee said that official information about the investigation found only in Internet site of the MAC. Links to any other sources, the publication of unofficial material and "copying" of the various versions of the causes of the accident conflict with the moral and ethical standards, international and Russian rules of accident investigation.
Ulf
report fra det russiske MAK , opdaterat 17/9
http://www.mak.ru/
http://translate.google.se/translat...&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http://www.mak.ru/&act=url
09/17/2011
According to the results of the field phase of the investigation the crash of the Yak-42 RA 42 434 in the terminal area of Yaroslavl and in accordance with a preliminary analysis of available documentation and data decryption means of objective control of the Technical Commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) was established:
Takeoff weight and center of gravity aircraft did not exceed the permissible limits.
Before beginning the takeoff flaps were set at 20 degrees (take-off position), the stabilizer -8.7 degrees on the pitch up, which corresponds to the estimated 24-25% of the alignment of the MAR.
Before takeoff the crew double-check all the channels had control of the aircraft, including the channel of the elevator, the elevator was deflected cleanly. The maximum recorded deflection of the elevator pitch up to 21 degrees, which corresponds to a constructive stop. Last check was performed for 1 minute and 40 seconds before takeoff.
Weather conditions at the time of the accident: wind 360 - 3 m / s, visibility 10 km, clouds significant stratocumulus lower limit of 990 m, the temperature of +17.8, 747.9 mm Hg pressure. Art., friction coefficient of 0.6.
Take off from runway 23 was carried out. Taxiing aircraft to take off was carried out by RD 5. Distance from RD 5 to the input end of runway 23 of about 300 meters. The total runway length of 3000 meters.
The crew decided to take off at nominal operation of the engine. Preliminary simulations showed that the rate of up to ~ 165 km / h acceleration rate corresponded to the plane actually installed engine thrust.
The rise of the nose wheel crew began at approximately 185 km / h. The elevator was rejected by pitch up to values of 9-10 degrees (about half speed), but the growth of the pitch angle has not happened. After 6 seconds the engine was installed takeoff mode. In the future, despite the output of engines for takeoff, the growth speed slowed significantly, which may be explained by the appearance of additional braking force. The actual value of an additional braking force will be established based on the results of mathematical modeling and field experiment, scheduled on a plane analog-to LII. MM Gromov. On the part of OKB preparing flight program of the meeting.
Surviving the braking systems of the aircraft sent to study in a specialized institution. Studies brake system started on 16 September.
The maximum speed is reached the plane, is approximately 230 km / h. In spite of continuing rejection of the elevator pitch up to the separation plane on the runway did not happen. According to the sketch scene of the accident, the actual separation of aircraft took place at a distance of 400 meters at the exit end runway 23 after deflection of the elevator at 13-14 degrees and the relocation of the stabilizer up to 9.5 degrees on the pitch up. After separation of the aircraft from the ground was his encounter with the antenna system localizer and the rapid growth of the pitch angle to 20 degrees for 2-3 seconds. Maximum height, which scored aircraft - of 5-6 meters.
Later followed by intensive krenenie plane to the left and its collision with obstacles and the ground.
According to the results the calculations of fragments of the aircraft revealed that at the time of the accident flaps and slats were installed during take-off position, the spoilers are retracted, the stabilizer in position about 10 degrees pitch up. Wiring layout elevator control showed that at the time of the accident was not disconnecting the wiring.
The Technical Commission fulfills all possible versions of the occurrence of additional braking force on the takeoff and the reasons why the aircraft failed to make timely detachment from the runway.
In connection with appearing in the media numerous "versions" of the causes of the accident with the Yak-42D RA-42 434, referring to close to the investigation of the "experts", the Technical Commission of the Interstate Aviation Committee said that official information about the investigation found only in Internet site of the MAC. Links to any other sources, the publication of unofficial material and "copying" of the various versions of the causes of the accident conflict with the moral and ethical standards, international and Russian rules of accident investigation.
Ulf
Last edited:
Og her et "fritt" oversatt transcript (fra sorte Voice Recorder ?)
hentet fra PPrune.org tråd :
Time stamps:
11:58:37 Captain: 74, 76.
11:58:40 F/E: 74, 76.
11:58:41 Captain: time, lights, taking off, limit 190.
11:58:53 Captain: 3, 4, 5, nominal (thrust).
11:58:58 F/E: At nominal.
11:58:59 F/E: Speed increasing.
11:59:04 F/E: Parameters OK.
11:59:07 F/E: 130
11:59:12 F/E: 150
11:59:15 F/E: 170
11:59:19 F/E: 190
11:59:27 F/E: 210
11:59:28 Captain: TOGA!
11:59:31 F/E: 220
11:59:34 F/E: 230
11:59:37 F/O: Probably the stabilizer
11:59:41 Captain: TOGA! TOGA! HS
11:59:47 F/O: What are you doing
11:59:48 Captain: TOGA!
11:59:49 F/E: TOGA
11:59:56 F/O: Andrey!
After 11:59:19 acceleretion decreased. Between first instruction instruction TOGA! and F/E confirmation seems to be interval 21 sec! It look like the first command was omited and TOGA was set after the captain secound command.
Ulf
hentet fra PPrune.org tråd :
Time stamps:
11:58:37 Captain: 74, 76.
11:58:40 F/E: 74, 76.
11:58:41 Captain: time, lights, taking off, limit 190.
11:58:53 Captain: 3, 4, 5, nominal (thrust).
11:58:58 F/E: At nominal.
11:58:59 F/E: Speed increasing.
11:59:04 F/E: Parameters OK.
11:59:07 F/E: 130
11:59:12 F/E: 150
11:59:15 F/E: 170
11:59:19 F/E: 190
11:59:27 F/E: 210
11:59:28 Captain: TOGA!
11:59:31 F/E: 220
11:59:34 F/E: 230
11:59:37 F/O: Probably the stabilizer
11:59:41 Captain: TOGA! TOGA! HS
11:59:47 F/O: What are you doing
11:59:48 Captain: TOGA!
11:59:49 F/E: TOGA
11:59:56 F/O: Andrey!
After 11:59:19 acceleretion decreased. Between first instruction instruction TOGA! and F/E confirmation seems to be interval 21 sec! It look like the first command was omited and TOGA was set after the captain secound command.
Ulf
Last edited:
Havarikommisjonen har avdekket betydelige mangler. Årsaken er at piloten slo bremsene på ved en feil (han hadde føttene på pedalene og ikke på gulvet), i tillegg til mange andre faktorer, bl.a. at co-pilot var sannsynligvis not fit for flight (under påvirkning av en medisin) og dårlig CRM i kabinen.
Rapporten på russisk er her: http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2011/final_ra-42434.pdf
NRK har også litt om saken: http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7859465
Rapporten på russisk er her: http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2011/final_ra-42434.pdf
NRK har også litt om saken: http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/verden/1.7859465
sirpjalle
ScanFlyer Mile High Club
Artikkel fra Aftenposten. Mye av det samme i denne artikkelen som de andre....
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/sport/Menneskelige-feil-bak-flykrsjen-6686753.html
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/sport/Menneskelige-feil-bak-flykrsjen-6686753.html
De har sett på indikatorene som det var mulig å få ut av apparetene og analysert det som de kaller "den bremsende kraften" (sorry, oversetter fra russisk uten å kunne den riktige terminologien, håper noen kan forklare bedre) og fant ut at eneste mulige årsaken til at denne kraften oppsto var at noen trykte på bremsepedalene (ingen feil i hydraulikk osv). Pilotene var bl.a. mer erfarne med Yak-40, som har to sett med pedaler - ett for styring og ett for bremsing, og man skal ifølge ops manual ha føttene på bremsepedalene under takeoff. På Yak-42 er den øvre delen av pedalen brukt for bremsing, og man skal ha føttene på gulvet under takeoff. Pilotenes trening på Yak-42 ofte avbrutt av flyvning på Yak-40. Piloten var rett og slett for vant til å ha føttene på pedalene uten å tenke at det kan gi en annen effekt på et annet fly. Dette iallefall ifølge havarikommisjonen.
Ganske utfyllende på avherald
http://avherald.com/h?article=4428da13/0014&opt=0
http://avherald.com/h?article=4428da13/0014&opt=0
