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Ekkel video
- Thread starter Concorde
- Start date
Replying to Topic 'Ekkel video'
The accident occurred in August 1992 at the Gimli Industrial Park in Manitoba—a
famous site in Canadian aviation history, where an Air Canada Boeing 767 known as the
Gimli Glider was dead-sticked onto a drag racing strip, following fuel exhaustion.
The accident aircraft is a highly modified de Havilland aircraft. In this case a Caribou had
been converted to turbine power and was operated under the EXPERIMENTAL category
of CAR 4b.
The accident investigation used this videotape and some 35mm photographs as a key
resource in determining what went wrong at Gimli.
With the exception of a slightly higher-than-normal nose attitude at lift-off, the aircraft’s initial climb appeared normal. At about 35 feet AGL, the aircraft made a noticeable pitchup movement.
A very close examination of the video does indicate rudder movement and minimal
elevator movement, during the start of the takeoff roll.
On the standard Caribou, the gust lock control handle is located forward of the power
quadrant, and it has two positions—forward for Unlocked, and aft for Locked. If the
control surfaces are not in the neutral position when the lock is engaged, any movement
of the surfaces through the neutral position will cause the lock to engage.
In addition, on the factory-standard Caribou, the control handle is designed so that when
it is in the aft-Locked position, the power levers cannot be fully advanced. This is
intended to prevent power application and takeoff when the gust lock system is engaged.
The accident investigation further revealed that the aircraft’s takeoff distance was
approximately 20 per cent longer than anticipated for the conditions. This may provide
further evidence that the gust locks played a part in this event.
Analysis of the recovered debris indicated that, although the aileron and elevator locking
mechanisms were in their respective Disengaged positions, the rudder locking
mechanism was found to have been in the fully engaged position at impact.
Further investigation revealed that in fact, it had been jammed there by the forces of the
impact. In addition, the analysis determined from the damage evidence that the aileron
control lock had been dis-engaged at the time of impact.
In its synopsis of the accident, the Transportation Safety Board concluded that the control gust lock system had not been fully disengaged prior to flight and that one or more of thelocking pins had become re-engaged after lift-off.
What could have prevented this accident? The most obvious solution was that a complete
six-point control check prior to takeoff would have revealed that free and proper
movement of the control system was compromised.
No control check was seen by witnesses on the ground, nor was one recorded on video or
still photography. As noted earlier, some rudder and elevator movement was observed, at the end of the runway at the start of the takeoff roll.
The Caribou’s standard procedures do allow for locking the control surfaces for ground
operation, but the aircraft flight manual also requires a six-point control check prior to
takeoff.
Another point—although not one addressed by the TSB in its review—concerns the crew.
We understand that shortly before the flight, the scheduled co-pilot—a very experienced
piston-Caribou captain—was replaced by another pilot with considerably less total time
and experience on type. He was, in fact, the aircraft owner’s son.
We therefore speculate whether a more experienced co-pilot might have caught the
missed six-point control check, or might have been more aware that the aircraft was not
responding as it should have.
During the post-accident autopsy, a knob from the gust lock handle was found embedded in the captain’s right wrist. The TSB concluded that the captain was attempting to operate the gust lock handle when the aircraft hit the ground.
Our expectation was that the pilot flying would have had his hand on the power lever
quadrant, which is located immediately aft of the gust lock handle. It is therefore
conceivable that, during the impact sequence, his hand might have moved forward, and
that this might account for the autopsy finding.
This accident investigation was problematic for us as the aircraft’s original manufacturer,
as we had not been involved in the turbine conversion, system modifications, or
subsequent flight testing.
The accident occurred in August 1992 at the Gimli Industrial Park in Manitoba—a
famous site in Canadian aviation history, where an Air Canada Boeing 767 known as the
Gimli Glider was dead-sticked onto a drag racing strip, following fuel exhaustion.
The accident aircraft is a highly modified de Havilland aircraft. In this case a Caribou had
been converted to turbine power and was operated under the EXPERIMENTAL category
of CAR 4b.
The accident investigation used this videotape and some 35mm photographs as a key
resource in determining what went wrong at Gimli.
With the exception of a slightly higher-than-normal nose attitude at lift-off, the aircraft’s initial climb appeared normal. At about 35 feet AGL, the aircraft made a noticeable pitchup movement.
A very close examination of the video does indicate rudder movement and minimal
elevator movement, during the start of the takeoff roll.
On the standard Caribou, the gust lock control handle is located forward of the power
quadrant, and it has two positions—forward for Unlocked, and aft for Locked. If the
control surfaces are not in the neutral position when the lock is engaged, any movement
of the surfaces through the neutral position will cause the lock to engage.
In addition, on the factory-standard Caribou, the control handle is designed so that when
it is in the aft-Locked position, the power levers cannot be fully advanced. This is
intended to prevent power application and takeoff when the gust lock system is engaged.
The accident investigation further revealed that the aircraft’s takeoff distance was
approximately 20 per cent longer than anticipated for the conditions. This may provide
further evidence that the gust locks played a part in this event.
Analysis of the recovered debris indicated that, although the aileron and elevator locking
mechanisms were in their respective Disengaged positions, the rudder locking
mechanism was found to have been in the fully engaged position at impact.
Further investigation revealed that in fact, it had been jammed there by the forces of the
impact. In addition, the analysis determined from the damage evidence that the aileron
control lock had been dis-engaged at the time of impact.
In its synopsis of the accident, the Transportation Safety Board concluded that the control gust lock system had not been fully disengaged prior to flight and that one or more of thelocking pins had become re-engaged after lift-off.
What could have prevented this accident? The most obvious solution was that a complete
six-point control check prior to takeoff would have revealed that free and proper
movement of the control system was compromised.
No control check was seen by witnesses on the ground, nor was one recorded on video or
still photography. As noted earlier, some rudder and elevator movement was observed, at the end of the runway at the start of the takeoff roll.
The Caribou’s standard procedures do allow for locking the control surfaces for ground
operation, but the aircraft flight manual also requires a six-point control check prior to
takeoff.
Another point—although not one addressed by the TSB in its review—concerns the crew.
We understand that shortly before the flight, the scheduled co-pilot—a very experienced
piston-Caribou captain—was replaced by another pilot with considerably less total time
and experience on type. He was, in fact, the aircraft owner’s son.
We therefore speculate whether a more experienced co-pilot might have caught the
missed six-point control check, or might have been more aware that the aircraft was not
responding as it should have.
During the post-accident autopsy, a knob from the gust lock handle was found embedded in the captain’s right wrist. The TSB concluded that the captain was attempting to operate the gust lock handle when the aircraft hit the ground.
Our expectation was that the pilot flying would have had his hand on the power lever
quadrant, which is located immediately aft of the gust lock handle. It is therefore
conceivable that, during the impact sequence, his hand might have moved forward, and
that this might account for the autopsy finding.
This accident investigation was problematic for us as the aircraft’s original manufacturer,
as we had not been involved in the turbine conversion, system modifications, or
subsequent flight testing.
