Ja, selvfølgelig. Det er, i grunnen, et spørsmål om jussen rundt AOC-er og det er ikke noe jeg er spesialist på.
Men jeg har litt problemer med å tro at man kan synse seg fram til hvem som burde hatt ansvar. Jeg opplever regelverket rundt det flyoperative som ganske spisset mot å plassere ansvar, også når det kan se uoversiktlig ut fra utsida.
Virkelig? Regelverket er fint og flott?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manx2_Flight_7100
"The Investigation identified a specific concern in respect of the lack of circumstantial review by the AOC issuer, the Agencia Estatal de Seguridad Aérea (AESA) – the Spanish CAA – when Flightline S.L. applied for and were granted a variation to their initially issued AOC to add two Metro III aircraft in 2010. AESA was reported to have specifically stated to the Investigation that “it did not feel it was within its remit to look for additional organisational and financial information to ensure that the Operator was adequately resourced to operate two additional aircraft.” However, it was noted that AESA had been aware that the two aircraft added to the AOC had previously been operated from an Isle of Man base for the same Ticket Seller under a Spanish AOC held by a Company called Eurocontinental Air which they had suspended because of "problems that arose in that operation" and following "an extended ramp inspection" at the Isle of Man. It was noted that AESA had advised the Investigation that it:
Had no knowledge of the ‘Owner’, which was a commercial company and therefore not within its regulatory remit
Was unaware of the connection between the ‘Ticket Seller’ and the ‘Owner’
Was unaware that two former Eurocontinental Air pilots had moved with the aircraft to the ‘Operator’
Was unaware of the remote Operation of the Metro III aircraft following their addition to the Operator’s AOC during 2010 and that had it known this, it would have taken a greater interest.
The Investigation therefore expressed its concern that "the regulatory authority of the State of the Operator did not identify the Operator’s shortcomings, thereby contributing to the cause of the accident." It noted that, since the UK and Irish regulators were expressly prohibited by Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 from exercising any regulatory function in respect of the operation of aircraft from other Member States within and between their territories, both were obliged to rely on the oversight of Spain "to ensure compliance in regulatory matters". It was concluded that in practice "the evidence shows that such oversight was of limited scope and low effectiveness." In this situation, the only "control" on safety standards was observed to have been the SAFA programme of ramp checks which in this case had not identified the extent of systemic shortcomings. However, it was accepted by the Investigation that "SAFA inspections are limited ….in what can be achieved in the protection of the aviation system". It was also noted that AESA oversight of the Operation required by Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 required that Member State issuing an AOC must also take responsibility for the corresponding Operating Licence. It was concluded that "there was no evidence of any such oversight (of the Operation ) being conducted by Spain", although noted that "the Regulation makes no provision nor provides procedures of how oversight should be conducted, in particular where operations are carried out from a base outside a Member State" (in this case the Isle of Man). Finally, the Investigation noted the involvement of the EU Air Safety Committee in relation to the Accident Operator in the months following the investigated accident and considered that the scope of its remit might usefully be widened "as part of the EU aviation safety net".[6](p138)"
